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Questions of embodied difference: Film and queer phenomenology 
 
by Katharina Lindner 
 
A phenomenological description of the cinematic situation considers the film as a lived 
body. Just as the human lived body forms the basis for intentionality, perception, 
expression and action in the world, the film’s body – its technological and instrumental 
dimension – forms the basis for the films perceptual and expressive engagement with the 
world. Technological methods and processes thus correlate with modalities of thought 
and consciousness.1  
 
We do not ‘lose ourselves’ in the film, so much as we exist – emerge, really – in the 
contact between our body and the film’s body. It is not a matter of simply identifying with 
the characters on screen, or with the body of the director or camera operator, for 
example. Rather, we are in a relationship of intimate, tactile, reversible contact with the 
film’s body – a complex relationship that is marked as often by tension as by alignment, 
by repulsion as often as by attraction.2  
 
Phenomenology can offer a resource for queer studies insofar as it emphasises the 
importance of lived experience, the intentionality of consciousness, the significance of 
nearness or what is ready-to-hand, and the role of repeated and habitual actions in 
shaping bodies and worlds.3 
 
Phenomenological debates around cinema put the ‘lived body’ at the centre of inquiry – this 
includes the body of the viewer and the body of the film. Herein lies film phenomenology’s most 
exciting appeal. In responding critically to accounts of the cinematic experience as abstract, 
disembodied, illusory, and substitutive (put forward by psychoanalytic as well as 
Marxist/ideological film criticism in particular4), it is the embodied nature of our engagement 
with cinema that is foregrounded. All kinds of bodies ‘matter’ within this area of critical debate – 
or, to put it more cautiously, they should matter. The aim of this paper is to begin to explore one 
of the perhaps marginalised areas within debates around film and embodiment: questions of 
embodied difference.  
 
From the outset, I want to make clear that this is by no means an attempt to reintroduce 
essentialising notions of ‘natural’ biological differences of gender or race, for instance. Rather, 
the aim is to suggest that contemporary work on cinema, embodiment, and affect could benefit 
from a more explicit acknowledgement of the significance of embodied and ‘lived’ difference, of 
differences in affective experiences and memories, and of ways of being-in-the-world and 
therefore perceiving the world. We need to account more efficiently for the ways in which 
cinema ‘touches’ and ‘moves’ us differently. 
 
This article will develop a theoretical argument – that is, an argument about theoretical 
developments within film studies and the potential resultant directions. Specifically, I will argue 
that contemporary work on film and embodiment might benefit from drawing on the insights of 
feminist and queer engagements with phenomenological questions of embodiment. Without 
calling into question the significance of existing phenomenological approaches to film,5 I want to 
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focus on some of the marginalised and less developed areas within this field. With the help of 
Sara Ahmed’s Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others in particular, I want to draw 
attention to the ‘straightforward’ orientation of film phenomenology and point to manners in 
which an acknowledgement of queer orientations and ways of being-in-the-world further open up 
the conceptual and political possibilities provided by the turn towards embodiment, lived 
experience, and affect within film criticism.  
 
Although the approach developed here could be applied to any film, there are, as Vivian 
Sobchack argues, certain films that engage the ‘sense-making capacities of our bodies’ more 
explicitly than others.6 It is the ratio of the explicit engagement of body and mind that varies 
from film to film or from genre to genre. However, I also want to suggest that there are certain 
kinds of viewers that might be more open to a sensuous and embodied engagement with cinema. 
Sobchack argues that we ‘see and comprehend and feel films with our entre bodily being, 
informed by the full history and carnal knowledge of our acculturated sensorium’.7 This 
understanding of our perceptive relations to the world and cinema as culturally and historically 
specific, as situated and ‘acculturated’, implies that different carnal histories and knowledges 
would be linked to differences in our ‘sensorium’, and as such to differences in our engagement 
with cinema.  
 
We are likely to be more open to the tactile or kinaesthetic dimensions of the cinematic 
experience if we have a particular history of tactile or kinaesthetic engagement with the world – 
that is, if we have come to embody a particularly tactile or kinaesthetic way of being-in-the-
world. The ‘sense-making capacities’ of our bodies might also be more readily engaged if we 
tend not to be provided with traditional cinematic pleasures or points of engagement. As the 
literature on queering and appropriation has shown, we can still take pleasure in films even when 
we are not provided with opportunities for identification or desire in relation to specific 
characters.8 I would like to add an embodied, phenomenological dimension to this debate. 
Phenomenological approaches to cinema allow us to re-think what it is that we are able to 
recognise, relate to, and identify within our encounter with cinema – a point I will elaborate 
further. 
 
The argument developed in the first part of this article will be illustrated with reference to queer 
cinema and with a specific focus on Cracks (2009) by Jordan Scott, a film with explicitly lesbian 
characters and an explicit lesbian storyline. I will argue that the pleasures that queer audiences 
might take from the film are most usefully identified by an emphasis on sensuousness and bodily 
affect – and, that they are less likely to be found in the realm of the (psychic) identifications and 
desires available in relation to characters and storyline, for instance.  
 
Cracks deploys a range of ‘negative’ lesbian stereotypes (exemplified by Eva Green’s character, 
Miss G, a predatory lesbian teacher at a boarding school for girls) and ends in death and 
devastation. An articulation of the pain and violence inflicted on queer characters by 
heteronormative and homophobic social structures can of course be useful and is important in 
highlighting continuing inequalities. This in itself can be ‘pleasurable’ in the sense that one’s 
identity position and a marginalised and disadvantaged socio-cultural status is acknowledged and 
made visible. However, an acknowledgement of the sensuous, embodied, and affective nature of 
our encounter with cinema provides a more comprehensive account of the pleasures and points 
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of engagement offered – especially when differences in our orientations, embodiments, ways of 
being-in-the-world, as well as our perceptive and expressive relations to the world and others are 
taken into account.  
 
Turning towards the body 
 
The reasons for a turn away from an exclusive emphasis on optical vision and ‘the gaze’ and 
towards the body as a whole, towards questions of embodiment and perception, and towards the 
interrelated nature of the senses, are, generally speaking, two-fold: concerns about the embodied 
nature of film and the film experience are linked both to changes in film-making practices (and a 
critical concern with those practices9) as well as to developments in theorising about film (that 
are partially related to changes in cinematic technologies and practices, but mainly to critiques of 
existing theories10). This includes, for instance, concerns over the gendered and racialised 
implications of established conceptualisations and manifestations of the gaze – both within 
cinema and also within the wider socio-cultural context, where looking (from a distance) is 
associated and inscribed with various hierarchies of power and control.  
 
Conceptualising our encounter with cinema in terms of voyeurism, narcissism, and fetishism, as 
well as  in terms of symbolically and ideologically constituted subject positions, tends to 
replicate dominant symbolic structures and power hierarchies and provides only limited 
possibilities for an understanding of the various points of engagement and viewing pleasures on 
offer – in relation to specific films and to cinema as a whole. Donna Haraway suggests that the 
gaze, including the human gaze and its various technological incarnations, ‘signifies the 
unmarked positions of Man and White [in] scientific and technological, late-industrial, 
militarized, racist, male-dominant societies’.11 She goes on to say that ‘eyes’, including those 
artificially constructed as well as our organic ones, constitute ‘active perceptual systems, 
building on specific ways of seeing, that is, ways of life’ that provide ‘highly specific visible 
possibilities, each with a wonderfully detailed, active, partial way of organising worlds’.12 This 
is why Haraway calls for an acknowledgement of the situated, partial, and embodied nature of 
vision and knowledge, by pointing to the need to ‘reclaim the sensory system that has been used 
to signify a leap out of the marked body and into a conquering gaze from nowhere’.13  
 
Importantly, Haraway points to the interrelated nature of the senses (that is, to the ‘sensory 
system’ that makes possible our contact and engagement with the world) and she develops 
explicit links between modes of perception and the different worlds we might perceive and 
experience. With this in mind, it is important to acknowledge that film viewing and film 
theorising do not take place in an abstract, ahistorical, and disembodied realm (as psychoanalytic 
film theory would have us believe). Vision and technologies of vision, including cinema, have 
very real and material implications. They discipline and shape bodies, relations between bodies, 
and bodily experiences, in addition to modes of being-in-the-word as well as the ‘world’ itself in 
fundamental ways. 
 
Phenomenological approaches to film are useful in that, rather than strictly opposing approaches 
based on optical vision, distance, and ‘the gaze’, they complement existing theories. From a 
phenomenological perspective, it is the body with its expressive and perceptive qualities that 
constitutes the necessary condition for looking, identification, emotions, and pleasure. After all, 
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it is the material body that makes looking and other sensory engagements with the world 
(including cinema) possible in the first place. It is at the level of the body that meaning is 
constituted; it is where we ‘apprehend’ the world and make ‘sense’ of environmental and 
physical stimuli.  
 
Building on the work of Laura Marks and Sobchack, Jennifer Barker takes such an approach in 
The Tactile Eye: Touch and the Cinematic Experience. She argues that 
  
a phenomenological approach to the cinematic experience […] focuses neither solely on 
the formal and narrative features of the film itself, nor solely on the spectator’s psychic 
identification with characters or cognitive interpretation of the film. Instead, 
phenomenological film analysis approaches the film and the viewer as acting together, 
correlationally, along an axis that would itself constitute the object of study.14  
 
This kind of approach can go some way in explaining how/why we might enjoy and derive 
particular kinds of pleasures from a film – even if it does not provide us with possibilities for 
identification in relation to particular characters and what they stand for and/or in relation to 
particular narrative structures and trajectories. Following Merleau-Ponty, Barker argues that film 
and viewer are in a ‘relationship of reversibility’ and that viewer and film ‘inhabit and enact 
embodied structures – tactile structures – that are not the same, but intimately related and 
reversible’.15  
 
She goes on to provide a fascinating and compellingly detailed exploration of what Sobchack 
calls the ‘common structures of embodied existence [and] similar modes of being-in-the-world’16 
that we share with cinema and that cinema shares with us. Barker goes beneath the skin (of the 
viewer and the film) in her account of the tactile dimensions of the cinematic experience and 
locates the ‘contact’ between viewer and film at the level of ‘skin’, and (delving further into the 
murky depth of the body) at the level of ‘musculature’ and ‘viscera’. While ‘skin’, following 
Marks’ notion of haptic visuality, is linked to surface and texture and to notions of eroticism and 
contact with the other, ‘musculature’ is linked to particular spatial structures, to ways of taking 
up, moving through, and extending space, and as such, to notions of kinaesthetic empathy, 
agency, and desire. ‘Viscera’, according to Barker, is linked to the rhythms in the most hidden 
depths of the body, and thus to temporal structures, to particular ways of experiencing, 
understanding, and embodying time that might lead to a ‘visceral resonance’ between viewer and 
film.17 Barker’s account is invaluable in its detailing of the various levels and layers at which our 
contact (or encounter) with film can be located, both in terms of (human) bodies within film as 
well as with the body of film itself.  
 
Barker’s argument is based, at least partially, on an understanding of the relationship between 
viewer and film in terms of its mimetic dimensions. On the one hand, cinematic gestures and 
movements have emerged based on human gestures and movements. For instance, the close-up 
mimics the human gesture of leaning forward in order to get a ‘closer look’. Conversely, we, as 
viewers, might mimic cinematic gestures or adjust our bodies in response to cinematic 
movements, as when we lean to one side in response to the erratic and swerving movements of a 
chase sequence. More generally, ‘film and viewer share certain deep-seated muscular habits, 
beginning with the very tendency to move through the world in an upright position. We and the 
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film are both inclined that way, as we are inclined to move and look forward, to face things 
directly’.18  
 
Modes of movement and comportment are also associated with particular affective implications, 
as they provide the basis for our expressive and perceptive relations to the world. Barker 
suggests that ‘swaggering, skulking, cowering, reaching, flinching, swaying, swerving, leaning 
or simply standing upright’,19 for instance, are simultaneously expressive and perceptive acts that 
articulate how we affect and how we are affected by objects and others. They are ways of 
orienting ourselves and arranging our body in space, and they take place in relation to our 
encounters with other bodies (human and cinematic).  
 
Developing a similar (although perhaps more cognitive-based) argument, Carl Plantinga in 
Moving Viewers asserts the importance of accounting more specifically for what he calls the 
‘pre-rational elements of spectatorship, in other words, responses that are to some extent 
automatic, pre-reflective body responses, rather than the intentional and interpretive cognitions 
of the conscious mind’.20 In particular, he focuses on the phenomenon of ‘motor mimicry’ as one 
aspect of the pre-rational element of spectatorship that is ‘the tendency of an observer to 
outwardly mimic the facial and body movements of another person’.21  
 
Motor mimicry is associated with affective mimicry and bodily empathy. For instance, we may 
not only experience sadness when we know why a particular character in a film cries (based on 
information provided through dialog and narrative); we may also experience, and exhibit, 
particular emotions when we see them displayed through characters’ facial expressions, gestures, 
and movements, which we then mimic. While Plantinga focuses mainly on the affective and 
embodied relationships we might develop towards characters in films, this argument can usefully 
be related to Sobchack’s and Barker’s notion of the body of films, including cinematic gestures, 
movements, and modes of comportment, as outlined above. This argument also contributes to 
unpacking the ways in which ‘emotional contagion’ might work – both in relation to characters 
in films and in relation to the cinematic experience as a whole.  
 
Antonio Damasio’s account of the workings of consciousness and emotions from a 
neurobiological perspective is insightful here, as he points to the wide-ranging physiological 
changes taking place in the body (including muscular-postural and muscular-visceral-endocrine 
adjustments) in our affective encounters with objects and others – most of which we cannot 
consciously control. Importantly, Damasio also suggest that ‘the records we hold of the objects 
and events we once perceived include the motor adjustments we made to obtain the perception in 
the first place and also include the emotional reactions we had then’.22 This is why certain bodily 
responses are not only evoked when we perceive an object or person, but also when we merely 
think of or remember an object or person – and further, when we witness particular expressions 
of emotions in other bodies, both human and cinematic. 
 
Whose body? 
 
What is perhaps slightly problematic about Barker’s work as well as other writing in this area is 
that it is based on seemingly unproblematic, universalising, and at times paradoxically ahistorical 
understandings of the body and embodiment. Despite the emphasis on the materiality of the body 
6 
 
and its concrete functioning, it is the white, male, heterosexual body that is implicitly at the heart 
of the theoretical underpinnings of much contemporary film phenomenology. Elena del Rio 
asserts that ‘the kind of phenomenology practiced by Merleau-Ponty falls short of considering 
the body in particularly gendered ways by simply assuming the white, male body as the universal 
measure of all bodies’.23 Arguing along similar lines, Ahmed suggests that Husserl’s 
phenomenology seems to involve an ‘ease of movement’ that implies a ‘mobile body’, one that 
‘can do’ things.24 Ahmed identifies the taken-for-granted ways of being-in-the-world at the heart 
of phenomenology in terms of heterosexuality and in terms of whiteness. The mobile body that 
can do things, that is characterised by an ease of movement, and for whom space constitutes the 
possibility of action, desire, and contact, is a body that takes up a very particular orientation 
towards the world and others that is based on the normative embodiment of heterosexuality and 
whiteness.  
 
This normative (white, male, heterosexual, and able) body also inadvertently underpins 
phenomenological film criticism – a point I want to illustrate in more detail. Drawing on 
Merleau-Ponty, Barker conceptualises our encounter with cinema in terms of tactility and 
contact: 
 
Tactility is a mode of perception and expression wherein all parts of the body commit 
themselves to, or are drawn into, a relationship with the world that is at once a mutual 
and intimate relation of contact. The intimate and close contact between touching and 
touched, as well as the relationship of mutual, reciprocal relationship that exists between 
them, are universal structures […]. Cinematic tactility, then, is a general attitude towards 
the cinema that the human body enacts in particular ways: haptically, at the tender 
surface of the body; kinaesthetically and muscularly, in the middle dimension of muscles, 
tendons and bones that reach toward and through cinematic space; and viscerally, in the 
murky recesses of the body, where heart, lungs, pulsing fluids, and firing synapses 
receive, respond to, and reenact the rhythms of cinema.25 
 
Feminist, gender, and queer studies critiques of traditional phenomenology articulate the grounds 
on which we might challenge the ‘universal structures’ and ‘general attitude’ that arguably 
underpin our perceptive and expressive relations to the world (and to cinema). Various ways of 
being-in-the-world are linked to differences in our tactile and kinaesthetic encounters with 
objects and others. For instance, using the notion of ‘sexual orientation’ as a starting point, 
Ahmed points to how different ways of being oriented (phenomenologically) mean that we ‘face’ 
the world and others differently; it means that different objects and others come ‘into view’ and 
are therefore ‘within reach’. In particular, she emphasises the spatiality of sexuality and points to 
the idea that ‘sexuality involves ways of inhabiting and being inhabited by space’ and is related 
to ‘ways of inhabiting and coexisting in the world’.26  
 
Queer ways of being-in-the-world are therefore characterised by differences in our relationships 
to space. We extend space differently based on how we are orientated in the world. This is why 
sexuality should not be seen as determined only by object choice, but as involving differences in 
one’s very relation to the world – that is, how one ‘faces’ the world or is directed toward it. Or 
rather, we could say that orientations towards sexual objects affect other things that we do, such 
that different orientations and different ways of directing one’s desire means inhabiting different 
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worlds’.27 Different ways of being-in-the-world mean that different objects and others are at-
hand, within ‘reach’, and familiar in the Heideggerian sense of the term. It also means that some 
objects and others are out of sight and not within reach. As such, our different ways of being 
oriented and of extending space open up (or close down) different possibilities for action and 
desire and for affecting and being affected by others. Importantly, such an understanding of 
(sexual) orientation engenders compelling new ways of thinking about the representability of 
queer identities and subjectivities (in cinema and elsewhere), in addition to new ways of 
conceptualising the identifications, pleasures, and points of engagement available for queer 
audiences in cinema. 
 
Elaborating on the affective dimensions of different orientations and suggesting that emotions 
towards objects and others involve ‘affective forms of (re)orientation’, Ahmed explains that 
  
it is not just that bodies are moved by the orientations they have; rather, the orientation 
we have toward others shape the contours of space by affecting relations of proximity and 
distance between bodies […]. Orientations involve different ways of registering the 
proximity of objects and others. Orientations shape not only how we inhabit space, but 
how we apprehend this world of shared inhabitance, as well as ‘who’ or ‘what’ we direct 
our energy and attention towards.28  
 
Queer bodies are characterised by facing the ‘wrong’ way, by tending towards ‘inappropriate’ 
others and directing their attention towards ‘deviant’ objects. This means that queer ways of 
being-in-the-world are characterised not only by tactile, kinaesthetic, or muscular relations to 
different others, but also by differences in the experience of proximity, contact, touch, and 
movement itself. Linking this back to cinema, a queer sense-ibility can be articulated not only by 
the representation of tactile relations to ‘inappropriate’ others, but also by differences in the 
articulation of tactility and contact itself. Not only do we touch and are touched by different, 
‘inappropriate’ objects and others, but we touch and are touched differently. Not only do we 
move and ‘tend towards’ different, ‘inappropriate’ objects and others, but we move and extend 
space differently.  
 
Queer bodies live their tactile, muscular, and kinaesthetic relations to objects and others 
differently. So if, as Sobchack and Barker suggest, we can conceive of cinema as a ‘lived body’ 
that shares our structures of embodied existence and modes of being-in-the world, including 
various gestures and modes of movement and comportment, then queer subjectivities can be 
articulated by and identified in relation to not just characters in film but the body film itself and 
our embodied relationships with that body.  
 
With reference to both Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, as well as to Judith 
Butler’s phenomenological account of gender as a repetition of bodily acts,29 Ahmed adopts a 
model of history as ‘bodily sedimentation’. She argues that ‘phenomenology helps us to explore 
how bodies are shaped by histories, which they perform in their comportment, their posture and 
their gesture’.30 It should become clear at this point what a queer film phenomenology might 
look like and what shape it might take, as well as the kinds of conceptual and political 
possibilities it opens up. Rather than conceptualising our tactile, muscular, and kinaesthetic 
encounter with cinema in universalising terms (as Barker does, at least to a certain extent), an 
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acknowledgement of the ways in which our embodied histories and habits shape our expressive 
and perceptive relations with the world and others adds a vital element of specificity – without, 
as I would like to re-emphasise, rehashing essentialising notions of bodily difference.  
 
Re-thinking identity and identification  
 
In The Address of the Eye, Sobchack calls for a return to questions of identification from a 
phenomenological point of view: ‘[w]e might wish to think again about processes of 
identification in the film experience, relating them not only to our secondary engagement with 
and recognition of “subject positions” or characters but rather to our primary engagement (and 
the film’s) with the sense and sensibility of materiality itself.’31 I want to follow Kate Ince in 
suggesting that the rather old-fashioned concepts of identity and identification (laden as they are 
with all kinds of ideological baggage) can regain significance if we move away from their 
largely abstract, ahistorical, decontextualised, and disembodied incarnations and move towards 
an understanding of ‘embodied cultural identity’ within film criticism.  
 
Ince follows Sobchack in suggesting a move away from a Lacanian understanding of primary 
and secondary identification as always involving a specular image (and the ways this has been 
taken up by Jean-Louis Baudry and Christian Metz, for instance) to argue for an understanding 
of identification based on the ‘sensational body’. She proposes that identification ‘is not specular 
at first, but “affective”’, that specular identification can only take place on the ‘ground of a 
preliminary affection’32, and that it is from our embodied, affective relations with the world and 
others that various forms of identification emerge. 
 
Such an understanding of identity (formation) and identification allows us to re-think our 
engagement with cinema in ‘sensational’ terms. Films not only provide possibilities for (psychic) 
identification with particular characters, they also open up possibilities for identification with 
affective situations that are constructed both through characters and narrative, but also through 
various (cinematic) movements, gestures, textures, or rhythms. In a similar vein, Misha Kavka 
points to the usefulness of thinking about ‘situational identifications that are affect based’ when 
she argues that we tend to ‘project ourselves into the scenario there where the affective flow feels 
most “true”’. 33 In this sense, the screen functions as a permeable membrane between different 
‘affective worlds’ that communicates this sensibility viscerally, through movement, gestures, 
colours, and sound.  
 
Various points of identification are on offer in our encounter with cinema, as we can identify 
with particular ways of being-in-the-world, particular orientations, and particular affective 
situations. These can be based on our embodied experiences and memories, our sedimented 
histories of accumulated affect, our acculturated sensorium, and the ways in which we extend 
space and time and relate to objects and others. The bodies in and of cinema embody and express 
our different attitudes, tendencies, habits, and orientations, and this is where possibilities for our 
embodied, sensuous, and affective engagements with cinema partially lie.   
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Cracks 
 
I would now like to illustrate the ideas outlined here with reference to Cracks. While this 
approach could be applied to any film, queer cinema provides a particularly useful starting point. 
With Cracks, I want to suggest that the film’s most powerful appeal lies in its articulation of 
particularly queer orientations and ways of being-in-the-world that provide opportunities for 
recognition and identification in tactile, muscular, and kinaesthetic terms. 
 
In her discussion of the significance of lesbian films in the context of queer cinema, Anat Pick 
writes that ‘screening lesbianism is not simply a matter of making the invisible visible, but of 
negotiating different regimes of visibility [and, I would like to add, different sensuous regimes]’. 
She asserts that we ‘need to interrogate marginal sexual identities not only as subject matter, but 
also as a stance, as a process of reinscription, as a way of situating oneself in relation to sets of 
images, experiences and historical formations’.34 What I want to focus on here is the embodied 
and bodily dimension of this ‘stance’.  
 
Following Ahmed’s Queer Phenomenology, taking up a particular stance means adopting a 
particular orientation towards the world; it means not only that we see/experience the world from 
a particular situated location, but that we ‘face’ the world in a particular way. What I will explore 
in relation to Cracks is not only the kind of stance, or orientation, embodied by the characters in 
the film, but also the ways in which the film ‘faces’ us by taking up a particular stance and 
embodying a particular orientation; what kind of ‘affective world’ is articulated in and through 
the film?  
 
Cracks is situated in 1930s England and takes place in a boarding school for girls. Miss G (Eva 
Green) is a teacher at the institution as well as the coach of the school’s diving team. The 
narrative tensions and resulting ‘love triangle’ evolve around Miss G and her fascination with 
and desire for her student Fiamma (Maria Valverde), as well as one of the other student’s (Di, 
played by Juno Temple) crush on Miss G and jealousy of Miss G’s (unrequited) desire for 
Fiamma. However, rather than focusing on characters or narrative, I want to explore the 
significance of the numerous sequences that take place in the lake in which the girls train. It is 
the depiction of bodily movement in and through water and the relations of bodies in water that 
provide the film’s most explicit articulation of queer ways of being-in-the-world and the kinds of 
‘affective flows’ that might resonate with queer viewers in particular. 
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Figure 1: Affective flows 
 
The quality of the ‘matter’ in which this movement of bodies occurs, and the ways in which 
bodily movement changes the arrangement of elements in the surrounding space, is made 
‘visible’ through the camera’s positioning underwater. The air bubbles and sun rays, floating 
through the water and past the bodies and the camera, emphasise the substance of the space in 
which movement occurs. The underwater sequences highlight the muscular efforts of movement 
and point to the resistance to movement that can be experienced in muscular terms (when 
particular movements are slower and much more strenuous in water than they are in the air). It is 
the tactile quality of the experience of moving in water that is foregrounded in particular. We are 
always consciously aware of the continuous contact between our skin and water because we are 
not used to it – it is unfamiliar, in ways in which our skin’s continuous contact with air is not. 
Ahmed, drawing on Heidegger’s account of ‘familiarity’, explains that familiarity is central to 
the notion of being oriented.35 The underwater sequences can thus be read and felt as 
articulations of a sense of disorientation, of unfamiliar ways of being-in-the word, and of non-
normative or queer orientations toward the world and toward others. 
 
The materiality of water also becomes particularly poignant when the characters open their eyes 
underwater. Looking in/through water gives the gaze a particularly haptic quality, as the 
materiality of the medium or ‘matter’ that touches and connects the bodies is emphasised. Air is 
often ‘invisible’, whereas water is not. What is articulated here is a different kind of looking, one 
that is explicitly linked to the sense of touch: the water both touches the eye the floating bodies, 
and the consistency and materiality of water becomes ‘visible’ as we look through it (along with 
the characters). It is not the distance implied by the gaze that is highlighted but rather closeness, 
proximity, and contact. 
   
In a number of sequences taking place in or around the lake the surface of the water also 
constitutes a threshold, where anything that is below this surface is unknown, both fascinating 
and perhaps threatening, especially if the camera and we as viewers remain above the surface. 
This becomes a threshold that we cannot see through. For instance, in one diving sequence, Miss 
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G forces Fiamma to perform another dive when she is too exhausted to do so. Miss G’s cruelty in 
this scene can be linked to Fiamma’s refusal to reciprocate Miss G’s approaches. Fiamma is 
forced to cross the threshold constituted by the surface of the water and enter into an unknown, 
threatening world. We remain on the platform along with the other characters and share their 
concern as to whether Fiamma will resurface, which she does after a considerable length of time. 
 
Water can be associated with a sense of disorientation because it implies a threshold into a 
different world, one in which normative and familiar rules of gravity and bodily movement do 
not apply. When we are in water our senses have to adjust because the normative and familiar 
rules of perception and expression become irrelevant. Our sensory relationship with the world 
changes dramatically, including our sense of vision, hearing, touch, smell, and taste, but also our 
kinaesthetic and muscular senses as well as our proprioceptive sense (our sense of our own 
bodily weight and the sense of the position of our body in space). This queer sense of space is 
articulated both through the movement of bodies in water as well as through the positioning and 
movement of the camera (underwater) that seems to be free from the familiar rules of gravity and 
comportment. We do not always know what is up or down, left or right, as the camera, the 
human bodies, the air bubbles, and the rays of light float freely and in seemingly unrestricted 
fashion, connected by the malleable materiality of water. 
 
As such, the underwater sequences might lead to a sense of disorientation: when we are in water, 
we are not ‘in our element’ and we do not experience the world in familiar ways. We need to re-
orient ourselves in order to find or re-gain our bearings. However, there are certain characters 
who seem to be ‘in their element’, ‘at ease’, or ‘at home’ when they are moving (and looking) in 
and through water. There is a sense in which they (and we as viewers) might experience a 
pleasurable and exhilarating sense of disorientation, of not knowing what direction we face, of 
not being restricted in our movement by the pull of gravity. When we are underwater we are also 
not being ‘directed’ in particular ways – we can find our own way and we do not have to follow 
the ‘path most trodden’.  
 
The masses of water that constitute space are explicitly and visibly malleable; they ‘take the 
shape’ of the bodies that inhabit it. Ahmed argues that spaces are not exterior to the body, but 
that space is ‘like a second skin’ that unfolds in the folds of the body.36 She also makes reference 
to the ‘skin of the social’ that makes impressions on and shapes the surface of the body, directing 
it in particularly heteronormative ways. What the smooth and comfortable movement underwater 
makes ‘visible’, then, is the ways in which queer bodies, those that do not ‘fit’ the skin of the 
social, are ‘in their element’ within a space that is unmarked and fluid. 
 
Ahmed argues that when bodies extend space comfortably, space constitutes the possibility for 
action and desire – and it is in this regard that the film’s depiction of bodies in water embodies 
particularly queer possibilities. The underwater sequences in particular function to articulate a 
sense of the queer affective relations between bodies that are ‘in touch’ and ‘in sync’ within a 
space that fits their shape and that provides a ground on which bodies can ‘gather’ and ‘tend 
toward’ each other. This includes the bodies in the film, the body of the film, as well as the body 
of the viewer.  
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What characterises Cracks, then, is that although it largely conforms to mainstream cinematic 
conventions, and although the female body and the relationships between the female characters 
are often heterosexualised and posited for a heterosexually desiring gaze in very traditional and 
stereotypical terms (and water dripping off the female body is certainly part of this), the film also 
manages to articulate particularly queer subjectivities. These possibilities exist outside of 
traditional binaries of identification and desire; they exist in relation to the film’s embodied 
articulation of subjectivity and desire (sexual and otherwise) that might ‘resonate’ with certain 
viewers based on their own embodiments of subjectivity and ways of being-in-the-world, and 
based on their own kinaesthetic, muscular, and tactile memories, experiences, and habits.  
 
Cracks might also appeal to, touch, or move viewers based on their embodied aspirations and 
‘tendencies’. Borrowing Patricia White’s argument in Uninvited, this is to say that films might 
not only speak to, touch, or move already-formed identities, but that they might play a part in 
their formation and their ‘becoming’. Ahmed’s phenomenological discussion of ‘tendencies’ 
(that recalls Butler’s notion of performativity) provides an embodied dimension to this argument: 
‘[b]odies are shaped by what they tend toward and the repetition of this “tending toward” 
produces certain tendencies.’37 What I want to suggest, then, is that the film can be read and 
‘felt’ as an articulation of particularly queer orientations and tendencies. It focuses on ‘minor’ 
characters (in the sense suggested by White in her discussion of lesbian minor cinema38); also, 
the film in part traces the processes through which the characters acquire certain ‘queer’ 
tendencies and orientations by ‘tending toward’ certain others in ways that disrupt the 
straightness of phenomenal space, and ways of inhabiting that space. Particularly in those 
moments that focus on bodily movement in, through, towards, and with water, the film itself, as I 
have tried to show, ‘embodies’ those tendencies, orientations, dis-orientations, and re-
orientations. 
 
This opens up possibilities for embodied viewer engagements with the process of acquiring 
certain tendencies and orientations, of extending space and ‘facing’ others in particular ways, 
and of disrupting straightforward understandings and experiences of phenomenal space. This is 
why the film might speak to, touch, move, and resonate with viewers that are not entirely 
comfortable, ‘at home’, or ‘in their element’ within the heteronormative structures of 
phenomenal space and the possibilities for action and desire it provides.  
 
So what? 
 
Kavka argues that affects do not reside in bodies but rather arise between bodies.39 Embodied 
engagements and affective identifications therefore depend on the interplay between a range of 
bodies: between bodies on and off screen, where the screen functions as an affective surface, a 
permeable membrane that allows for the relations between bodies and between the ‘affective 
worlds’ on either side of the screen; and between the body of the spectator and the body of the 
film. Affects are economic in that they circulate between bodies and create alignments and 
attachments.40 The political significance of cinema can therefore be located, at least in part, in 
the ways in which certain films provide opportunities for the alignment of, and attachment 
between, certain kinds of bodies.  
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Queer bodies might gather in and around certain films and form the basis for a sense of 
community through shared alignments, attachments, and orientations. We might think of 
community and identity in terms of shared affects, tendencies, and habits; and of cinema as 
giving expression to, and resonating with, particular histories of bodily sedimentation. With this 
in mind, a phenomenological approach to cinema that accounts for embodied differences allows 
us to think about our various encounters with cinema, including pleasures, frustrations, tensions, 
alignments, repulsions, mobilisations, and attractions in non-essentialising terms, while not 
losing sight of the body that makes these encounters possible in the first place.  
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